

Instituições Políticas em Perspectiva Comparada (3 créditos)

Prof.^a: Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo

Horário: Terça-feira, das 13 às 16 horas

Consultas: A combinar com o professor

Objetivos:

Este curso visa introduzir os alunos no estudo das instituições políticas listadas abaixo e discutir o efeito de cada uma delas no funcionamento e desempenho dos sistemas políticos. Sendo assim, foram selecionados textos que permitam caracterizar as instituições, identificar os formatos que assumem em diferentes países, inclusive o Brasil, e analisar de forma comparada as instituições selecionadas.

As seções combinarão aulas expositivas e seminários, requerendo a leitura prévia dos textos obrigatórios indicados seguindo um cronograma a ser distribuído na primeira aula. A avaliação será feita de duas formas: 1) cada aluno ficará responsável pela apresentação de uma revisão crítica (2-3 páginas) de pelo menos dois textos ao longo do semestre, que deverá circular entre os colegas previamente à sua discussão em aula; 2) cada aluno deverá fazer um trabalho final a ser definido no decorrer do curso.

Programa:

1. Sistemas de Governo
2. Sistemas Eleitorais e Partidários
3. Organização do Estado: Federalismo
4. Organização do Legislativo
5. Poderes de Agenda
6. Tipos de Governos e Coalizões Políticas

Bibliografia

1. Sistemas de Governo

Cheibub, José Antonio & Jennifer Gandhi. 2004. "Classifying Political Regimes: A Six-Fold Classification of Democracies and Dictatorships." Presented at the 2004 Annual APSA Meeting.

Cheibub, José Antonio. 2007. *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Eaton, Kent. 2000. "Parliamentarism and Presidentialism in the Policy Arena," *Comparative Politics*, October.

Elgie, Robert. 1999. "The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism" and "Semi-Presidentialism and Comparative Institutional Engineering." In Robert Elgie (org.). *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Moe, Terry M. e Michael Caldwell. 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems." *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 150/1: 171-95.
- Samuels, David e Shugart, Matthew. 2010. *Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior*. Cambridge University Press.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1994. *Comparative Constitutional Engineering*. New York: NYU Press, pp.83-140.
- Shugart, M. (2005). "Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns". *French Politics*, vol. 3, nº 3, pp. 323-351.
- Shugart, Matthew Soberg & John M. Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2. Sistemas Eleitorais e Partidários

- Carey, John & Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1994. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas." *Electoral Studies* 14(4):417-439.
- Cox, Gary W. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Cox, Gary W. 1987. *The Efficient Secret. The Cabinet and the Development of Política Parties in Victorian England*; Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Crisp, Brian F., Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon, Bradford S. Jones, Mark P. Jones and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. 2004. "Vote-Seeking Incentives and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential Democracies." *Journal of Politics* 66(3):823-848.
- Foweraker, Joe. 1998. "Review Article: Institutional Design, Party Systems and Governability – Differentiating the Presidential Regimes in Latin América". *British Journal of Political Science*, 28, no. 4, pp. 651-676.
- Gallagher, M. e Mitchell. Paul. 2006. *The Politics of Electoral Systems*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Fiorina, Morris. Cain, Bruce & Ferejohn, John. 1987. *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

- Golden, Miriam A. 2003. "Electoral Connections: The Effects of the Personal Vote on Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Legislation in Postwar Italy". *British Journal of Political Science* 33:189-212.
- Haggard, Stephan & Mathew D. McCubbins. 2001. "Introduction: Political Institutions and the Determinants of Public Policy" in Stephan Haggard and Mathew McCubbins, eds, *Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Jones, Mark. 1995. *Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies*. Cap. 5. Legislative Multipartyism and Presidential Legislative Support. Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott. 1993. "Presidentialism, multipartyism and Democracy: the Difficult Combination". *Comparative Political Studies* 26, 2 (July), 198-228.
- Mainwaring, Scott & Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1997. *Presidentialism and democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott. *Sistemas Partidários em Novas Democracias – O Caso do Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro, FGV/Mercado Aberto.
- Nicolau, Jairo. 2006. "O Sistema Eleitoral de Lista Aberta no Brasil" *DADOS – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, Rio de Janeiro, Vol. 49, no 4, pp. 689 a 720.
- Pradeep K. Chhibber & Ken Kollman. 2004. *The Formation of National Party Systems: Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India and the United States*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sartori, Giovanni. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework For Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- Shugart, Matthew Soberg & Martin P. Wattenberg. 2001. "Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: A Definition and Typology" in Shugart and Wattenberg, eds. *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. pp.9-24.

3. Organização do Estado: Federalismo

- Bednar, Jenna. 2009. *The Robust Federation: Principles of Design*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Filippov, M., Ordeshook, P. C. & Shvetsova, O. 2004. *Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gibson, Edward L., Ernesto Calvo & Tulia G. Falleti. 2004. "Reallocative Federalism: Legislative Overrepresentation and Public Spending in the Western Hemisphere"

- in Edward L. Gibson, ed. *Federalism and Democracy in Latin America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 173-196
- Jones, Mark P., Sanguinetti, Pablo & Tommasi, Mariano. 2000. "Politics, Institutions, and Fiscal Performance in a Federal System: An Analysis of the Argentine Provinces." *Journal of Development Economics* 61:305-333.
- Kincaid, J.&e Tarr, A. (eds.) 2005. *Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries*. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.
- Melo, Marcus A. 2005. "O Sucesso Inesperado das Reformas de Segunda Geração: Federalismo, Reformas Constitucionais e Política Social, *Dados* vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 845-889.
- Obinger, H. Leibfried, S. & Castels, F. (eds.). 2005. *Federalism and the Welfare State: New World and European Experiences*.
- Pierson, Paul, 1995. "Fragmented Welfare States: Federal Institutions and the Development of Social Policy," *Governance* 8, 4 (1995): 449-78.
- Rodden, Jonathan. 2004. "Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement". *Comparative Politics*, July.
- Samuels, David & Scott Mainwaring. 2004. "Strong Federalism, Constricts on the Central Government, and Economic Reform in Brazil in Edward L. Gibson, ed. *Federalism and Democracy in Latin America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 85-130.
- Samuels, David & Snyder, Richard. 2001. "The Value of Vote: Malapportionment in Comparative Perspective." *British Journal of Political Science* 31 (4):651-671, October.
- Stepan, Alfred. 2004. "Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, Multinationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism" in Edward L. Gibson, ed. *Federalism and Democracy in Latin America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp.29-84.
- Souza, Celina. 2007, "Coalizões eleitorais e ajuste fiscal nos estados brasileiros". *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais*. , v.22, p.31 - 54, 2007.
- Yusako Horiuchi & Jun Saito. 2003. "Reapportionment and Redistribution: Consequences of Electoral Reform in Japan." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4):669-682, October.

4. Organização do Legislativo e Processo Decisório

- Arnold, Douglas. 1990. *The Logic of Congressional Action*. new Haven, Yale University Press.

- Clinton, Joshua D. 2007, "Lawmaking and Roll Calls". *Journal of Politics*, vol. 69, nº 2, pp. 455- 467
- Cox, Gary. 2002. "On the Effects of Legislative Rules". *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 455-467.
- Cox, Gary & Scott Morgenstern. 2002. "Epilogue: Latin America's Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents" in Scott Morgenstern e Benito Nacif (orgs.), *Legislative Politics in Latin America*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 446-468.
- Cox, Gary & Mathew McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkley, University of California Press.
- Fiorina, Morris. 1977. *Congress: the Keystone of the Washington Establishment*. New Haven, Yale University Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1990. *Information and Legislative Organization*. Michigan, Michigan University Press. pp. 1-21; 247-266.
- Mayhew, David. 1974. *The Electoral Connection*. New Haven, Yale University Press.
- Santos, Fabiano e Almeida, Acir . 2005. "Teoria informacional e a seleção de relatores na Câmara dos Deputados". *Dados*, Dez 2005, vol.48, no.4, p.693-735.
- Shepsle, Kenneth & Weingast, Barry. 1994. "Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions". *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 149-179.

5. Poderes de Agenda e Delegação

- Alemán, Eduardo & Tsebelis, George. 2002. "Agenda Control in Latin American Presidential Democracies." Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29 to September 1.
- Carey, John M, & Matthew Shugart (orgs.) 1998. *Executive Decree Authority*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cooper, Phillip. 2002. *By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action*. Lawrence, Kansas University Press.
- Cox, Gary W. & McCubbins, Mathew D. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the House of Representatives*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Döring, Herbert. 2001. "Parliamentary Agenda Control and Legislative Outcomes in Western Europe". *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, XXVI, 1, February.

- Döring, Herbert. 1995. "Time as a Scarce Resource: Government Control of the Agenda." In Herbert Döring (org.). *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*. Frankfurt/New York: Campus/St. Martin's.
- Epstein, David, & Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Costs Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers*. New York:Cambridge.
- Hallerberg, Mark & Marier, Patrick. 2004. "Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3)571-587, July.
- Huber, John D. 1996. *Rationalizing Parliament*. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
- Huber, John D. 1998. "Executive decree authority in France" in Carey, John M, and Matthew Shugart (orgs.). *Executive Decree Authority*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 233-253.
- Kleinerman, Benjamin A. 2006.*The Discretionary President: The Promise and Peril of Executive Power*. Lawrence, Kansas University Press.
- Metcalf, Lee Kendall . 2000. "Measuring Presidential Power." *Comparative Political Studies* 33(5):600-685, June.
- Moe, Terry M. & William Howell. 1999. "The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 15 No.1(April): 132-179.

2. Tipos de Governos e Coalizões Políticas

- Cheibub, José Antonio, Adam Przeworski, Sebastian Saiegh. 2004. "Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Parliamentarism and Presidentialism." *British Journal of Political Science* 34:565-87, October.
- Chasquetti, Daniel. 2001. "Democracia, Multipartidarismo y Coaliciones en América Latina: Evaluando la difícil Combinación" in Jorge Lanzaro (org.) *Tipos d e Presidencialismo y Coaliciones Políticas en América Latina*. Buenos Aires, CLACSO, pp.319-359.
- Deheza, Ivana G. 1997. "Gobiernos de Coalición en el Sistema Presidencial: América del Sur" in Dieter Nohlen e Mario Fernández (orgs) *El Presidencialismo Renovado: Institucionalismo Y Cambio Político en America Latina*. Caracas, Nueva Sociedad, pp. 151-169.
- Figueiredo, Argelina & Canello, Júlio & Martins, Marcelo. 2012. "Governos minoritários no presidencialismo latino-americano: determinantes políticos e institucionais". *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, Vol. 55, no. 4.

- King, Anthony. 1976. "Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France, and West Germany." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1:11-34.
- Laver, Michael & Norman Schofield. 1990. *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Laver, Michael & Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1996. *Making and Breaking Governments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Laver, Michael. 1998. "Models of Government Formation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 1:1-25.
- Müeller, Wolfgang & Kaare Strom (orgs.). 2000. *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*. London. Oxford University Press, pp. 1-31.
- Martin, Lanny W. 2004. "The Government Agenda in Parliamentary Democracies". *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, no. 3, July.
- Schofield, Norman. 1993. "Political competition and multiparty coalition government". *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 23, pp. 1-33.
- Strom, Kaare 1990, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Strom, Kaare, Muller, W. e Bergman, T. (eds) 2008. *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: the Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Volden, Craig & Clifford J. Carrubba. 2004. "The formation of oversized coalitions in parliamentary democracies". *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, no. 3, July.